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1Abstract
We investigate the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy surprises for US data, using vector
autoregressions. We overcome the diﬃculties that changes in ﬁscal policy may
manifest themselves in variables other than ﬁscal variables ﬁrst and that ﬁscal
variables may respond ”automatically” to business cycle conditions. We do so
by using sign restrictions on the impulse responses as method of identiﬁcation,
extending Uhlig (1997), and by imposing orthogonality to business cycle shocks
and monetary policy shocks. We ﬁnd that controlling for the business cycle shock
is important, but controlling for the monetary policy shock is not, that government
spending shocks crowd out both residential and non-residential investment but do
not reduce consumption, that a deﬁcit spending cut stimulates the economy for
the ﬁrst 4 quarters but has a low median multiplier of 0:5, and that a surprise tax
increase has a contractionary eﬀect on output, consumption and investment. Our
results diﬀer from the benchmarks of Ricardian equivalence and tax smoothing,
and are more in line with theories which allow for intergenerational redistribution
with limits to the compensating eﬀects of bequests. The best ﬁscal policy for
stimulating the economy appears to be a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cut.
JEL Codes: C32, E60, E62, H20,H50,H60.
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Vector Autoregression,
Bayesian Econometrics, Agnostic identiﬁcation,
Fields: Macroeconomics, Public Economics, Econometrics-Time Series.1 Introduction
What are the eﬀects of tax cuts on the economy? And does it matter whether they are
ﬁnanced by corresponding cuts of expenditure or by corresponding increases in govern-
ment debt? These questions are of key importance to the science of economics and the
practice of policy alike. This paper aims at answering these questions by proposing and
applying a new method of identifying ﬁscal policy surprises in vector autoregressions.
Modern macroeconomics views the economy as a dynamic, stochastic system, which
can be understood by analyzing the responses to present and past random shocks. From
this perspective vector autoregressions (VARs) are well suited as an empirical tool and a
large literature has successfully applied them, in particular, to the analysis of the eﬀects
of monetary policy shocks, see e.g. Leeper Sims and Zha (1996), Christiano Eichenbaum
and Evans (1997) or Favero (2001) for excellent surveys.
In contrast, the literature on applying vector autoregressions to analyze the eﬀects
ﬁscal policy is rather thin. The topic has received attention only rather recently, most
notably by Blanchard and Perotti (1999), Fatas and Mihov (2001a,b) and Favero (2002).
Progress in this area has largely been thwarted by three problems. First and perhaps
most importantly, ﬁscal policy surprises may not show up in ﬁscal variables ﬁrst. Fiscal
policy changes are often preceded by lengthy debates in Congress and so when the changes
take place, they no longer are a surprise and private individuals may already have changed
their consumption and investment decisions. Likewise, the outcome of the tight Gore-
Bush race in 2000 might have changed beliefs about future tax cuts signiﬁcantly before
the actual tax cuts were passed by Congress. Thus, relying on unpredicted movements in
ﬁscal variables alone is likely to miss many of the interesting ﬁscal policy surprises driving
the economy. The second problem is the separation of movements in ﬁscal variables which
are caused by ﬁscal policy shocks and those which are simply the automatic movements
of ﬁscal variables in response to the business cycle. Finally, while there is agreement
that a monetary policy shock entails a surprise rise in interest rates, several competing
deﬁnitions come to mind for ﬁscal policy shocks.
This paper confronts these problems directly. To address the third, we identify
three benchmark ﬁscal policy shocks rather than only one. We analyze a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced
ﬁscal expansion, a balanced-budget ﬁscal expansion as well as a revenue shock, in which
government revenues go up but spending remains unchanged. To address the second
problem, we also identify a business cycle shock as well as a monetary policy shock and
require the ﬁscal shock to be orthogonal to them, thereby ﬁltering out the automatic
1responses.
Finally, for the ﬁrst and main problem, we do not rely on a decomposition of
contemporaneous cause and eﬀects, but rather identify ﬁscal policy shocks by observing
their consequences several quarters into the future. For example deﬁcit-ﬁnanced pol-
icy shocks are identiﬁed by requiring government expenditures to rise but government
revenues to stay unchanged during a whole year following the shock, compared to the
no-shock scenario. That way, ﬁscal policy shocks which change government expenditure
in the near future, but not immediately, are captured.
We apply this method to US quarterly data, from 1955 to 2000. We ﬁnd that
² controlling for the business cycle shock is important, but controlling for the mone-
tary policy shock is not, when analyzing the allocative consequences of ﬁscal policy,
² government spending shocks crowd out both residential and non-residential invest-
ment without having a large eﬀect on interest rates,
² deﬁcit spending shocks do not reduce private consumption,
² a deﬁcit spending shock weakly stimulates the economy for the ﬁrst 4 quarters but
has a low median multiplier of approximately 0.5,
² a surprise deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cut is the best ﬁscal policy to stimulate the economy,
as it has a maximum median multiplier of approximately 2.
We note that these results diﬀer from the benchmark of Ricardian equivalence
or the benchmark of tax smoothing, as these theories would predict that a marginal
change in the ﬁnancing of a given stream of government expenditures should have no
or only second-order eﬀects. A closer match to the data may be expected from theories
which analyze the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy changes from the perspective of intergenerational
redistribution with limits to the compensating eﬀects of bequests. Our ﬁnding that
government spending crowds out both private residential and non-residential investment
without changing interest rates much is most consistent with a theoretical view, in which
shocks to government spending are (possibly imperfect) substitutes for private investment
rather than private consumption.
The paper is comprised of two main sections. Section 2 describes the identiﬁcation
of ﬁscal shocks. The empirical results are presented in section 3. A conclusion is in
section 4. The appendix contains additional detail, in particular on the VAR framework
and the sign restriction methodology as well as describing the data sources.
21.1 Comparison with the literature
The method of identifying policy shocks using sign restrictions on impulse responses has
been introduced and been applied to monetary policy shocks in Uhlig (1997). Similarly,
Faust (1998) uses sign restrictions, imposing them only at the time of impact however.
Canova and De Nicolo (2000) and Canova and Pina (1998) identify shocks using sign
restrictions on impulse response correlations. Uhlig’s method is extended here by im-
posing orthogonality to the business cycle shock. The focus of interest in this paper is
the response of output, private consumption and private non-residential and residential
investment to shocks. We therefore impose no identifying restrictions on the responses
of these variables and so, as in Uhlig (1997), the method “agnostic” with respect to these
variables.
Our approach diﬀers from and complements Fatas and Mihov (2001a,b) and Favero
(2002) in that we do not rely on instantaneous movements in ﬁscal variables and assump-
tions about the sluggishness of certain variables to identify ﬁscal policy shocks. Further-
more, we allow for a variety of ﬁscal policy shocks, while for example Fatas and Mihov
(2001a) focuses on shocks to the deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio and Fatas and Mihov (2001b)
analyzes shocks to government spending as prototype ﬁscal policy shocks.
Our method is most sharply diﬀerentiated from most of the previous literature in
that it relies on macroeconomic time series data alone for shock identiﬁcation. Previous
work on ﬁscal policy such as Romer and Romer (1994), Ramey and Shapiro (1997), Edel-
berg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998) and Blanchard and Perotti (1999) use additional
information such as the timing of wars, detailed institutional information about the tax
system and detailed historical study of policy decisions or elections in order to identify
ﬁscal policy shocks from automatic movements in the business cycle. We view this paper
as complementary to these approaches also. While a more narrative approach can add
information, a vector autoregressive approach oﬀers an automatically systematic account
of ﬁscal policy shocks.
Our results agree with some of the ﬁndings of these previous studies but disagree
with others. As in the studies of Blanchard and Perotti (1999), Ramey and Shapiro
(1997), and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998), we ﬁnd that increased government
spending decreases residential investment. In contrast to these previous studies however,
we ﬁnd that non-residential investment is also crowded out by increased government
spending. With regard to output and consumption we ﬁnd that deﬁcit-ﬁnanced spending
expansions leave GDP and private consumption unchanged after a 4 quarter lag. This
3contrasts with Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998)
who ﬁnd that output rises and consumption falls in response to an increase in government
spending, and also with Fatas and Mihov (2001b) who ﬁnd a strong positive consumption
response. Finally our results agree with Blanchard and Perotti (1999), that revenue
shocks have a negative impact on output. Indeed the revenue shock has the strongest
impact of all our prototype ﬁscal policy shocks.
Despite, or possibly because of, the small number of studies employing vector au-
toregressions, there are a wide variety of other empirical studies investigating the eﬀects
of ﬁscal policy. An excellent survey can be found in Hemming, Kell and Mahfouz (2000),
and there is no point in repeating their summary here. We wish to highlight Alesina
and Perotti (1995) and Perotti (1999) in particular, who show how the success of a ﬁscal
adjustment depends crucially on the relative importance given to certain expenditure
reductions and tax increases. The more weight is given to reducing transfer payments
and the less weight to tax increases the greater the chance that the ﬁscal adjustment will
be a success. Likewise, we distinguish between the eﬀects of tax increases versus expen-
diture reductions when reducing deﬁcits, and ﬁnd similar results. The methodology of
this paper could be extended to an even more disaggregated analysis: e.g. the govern-
ment expenditure variable could be split into government consumption and government
investment. To avoid a plethora of results here, we leave this to future work.
A number of authors have investigated ”Non-Keynesian” eﬀects of ﬁscal contrac-
tions or nonlinear eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, stemming from re-establishing credibility, most
notably Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (1990, 1996, 2000). Likewise, Perotti (1999) shows
how the eﬀects of a reduction in government expenditure can depend on the state of the
economy. He shows that a reduction in government expenditure may not be contrac-
tionary if it is seen as re-establishing government solvency. Our identiﬁcation method
relies on assuming positive comovements in real GDP and government revenue to result
from shocks other than ﬁscal policy shocks. While we view this assumption to be reason-
able as well as minimalistic for identifying ﬁscal policy shocks, it also implicitely biases
the results against strong Non-Keynesian eﬀects.
2 Identifying Fiscal Policy Shocks
A ﬁscal policy shock is an unpredicted change in ﬁscal policy. Unfortunately, there is
no such thing as a ﬁscal policy shock ”per se”. Fiscal policy encompasses a wide variety
4of policies: there is an endless list of types of incomes, for which the tax rules could be
changed, or categories of government spending, where changes could occur. In this paper
we address the much broader and traditional ‘macro’-economic issue of the eﬀects on the
aggregate economy of aggregate ﬁscal variables. Even so there still remain a large set of
possible policies, since changes in ﬁscal policy could be about changing the tax-debt mix
for ﬁnancing a given stream of government expenditures, or about changing the level of
expenditures. Each one of the three ﬁscal variables - expenditures, revenues and deﬁcits
- could be held constant when changing ﬁscal policy, by changing the mix of the other
two.
We therefore identify and analyze three prototype ﬁscal policy shocks: a “rev-
enue shock”, where revenues and deﬁcits change, but expenditures are left unchanged,
a “deﬁcit spending shock”, where an increase in government spending is entirely deﬁcit-
ﬁnanced, and a “balanced budget spending shock”, where an increase in government
spending is tax-ﬁnanced. While these three shocks are by no means an exhaustive list
of what one might want to consider ﬁscal policy shocks, they span an interesting and
signiﬁcant subspace of all ﬁscal policy shocks.
When do these shocks occur? Considering the potentially lengthy debates in
Congress about, say, a reduction in tax rates, the change in government revenue is
fairly predictable by the time the tax reduction actually takes eﬀect. Forward-looking
individuals and ﬁrms can adjust their economic choices before that date. While the tax
change will happen eventually, the surprise of a change in ﬁscal policy occurs earlier.
This is a thorny and well-understood diﬃculty when identifying ﬁscal policy shocks.
Our solution is to ﬁnd a method which relies less on the instantaneous reactions of
ﬁscal variables as is typically done in traditional VAR identiﬁcation, but rather exploits
the idea that ﬁscal variables respond to ﬁscal policy shocks further down the road.
More precisely, we employ the sign restriction methodology of Uhlig (1997): we identify
ﬁscal policy shocks by restricting the impulse responses of the ﬁscal variables to have a
particular sign for up to four quarters after the shock.
A further problem is to distinguish genuine ﬁscal policy shocks from responses of
ﬁscal variables to business cycle movements and monetary policy shocks. We solve this
problem by also identifying a business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock and
by requiring the ﬁscal policy shock to be orthogonal to both of them. The business
cycle shock is identiﬁed in a way that is consistent with both demand and supply side
explanations and so we regard it as atheoretical. Furthermore, we choose an expenditure
5variable excluding some systematically moving components such as transfer payments,
see for example Blanchard (1997) on this.1
The restriction that ﬁscal shocks be orthogonal to the business cycle shock has a
large eﬀect on the results. This makes sense. If we would not control for the state of
the business cycle, we would end up confusing, for example, an increase in government
receipts due to a business cycle upturn with an upturn ”caused” by a tax increase.
However, the choice of requiring the business cycle shock to be causally prior to the ﬁscal
policy shock requires a defense. We regard it as an additional identifying assumption
beyond the sign restriction on the impulse responses of the ﬁscal variables, and as the
most prudent choice. In explaining GDP movements, this assumption leaves as much
as possible to the business cycle shock. Whatever is left over is then more plausibly
an estimate of the eﬀect of a ﬁscal policy shock than if we were not or only partially
controlling for the business cycle eﬀect. Furthermore, our results are also compatible
with a data generating process where ﬁscal policy shocks are causally prior to business
cycle shocks, but do not move output, consumption and investment in the same direction.
2.1 The VAR and Identifying Restrictions
We use a VAR in GDP, private consumption, total government expenditure, total govern-
ment revenue, private residential investment, private non-residential investment, interest
rate, adjusted reserves, the producer price index for crude materials and the GDP de-
ﬂator. The VAR system consists of these 10 variables at quarterly frequency from 1955
to 2000, has 6 lags, no constant or a time trend, and uses the logarithm for all variables
except the interest rate where we have used the level. The chosen approach largely dic-
tates the choice of these variables. GDP, private consumption and private investment
are included as the focus of interest. Private consumption is also included because the
consumption-GDP ratio has predictive value for GDP, as Cochrane (1994) has shown.
We split private investment into residential and non-residential investment as the dif-
ferential responses of residential versus nonresidential investment to ﬁscal shocks has
attracted attention in the literature, see Ramey and Shapiro (1997). The two ﬁscal vari-
ables allow the identiﬁcation of ﬁscal policy shocks. We use revenues rather than tax
rates, since it seemed to us to be a more reliable indicator for the ﬁscal stance: there
1This deﬁnition of the government expenditure and revenue variables is described in Appendix B and
follows Blanchard and Perotti (1999). We use these deﬁnations in order not to obscure the implications
of the new identiﬁcation technique used in this paper, by using diﬀerent data.
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Business Cycle + +




Balanced Budget + +
Deﬁcit Spending 0 +
Table 1: A ”+” means that the impulse response of the variable in question is restricted
to be positive for four quarters following the shock, including the quarter of impact.
Likewise, a ”-” indicates a negative response and a ”0” indicates a zero response in the
four quarter window. A blank entry indicates, that no restrictions have been imposed.
are many diﬀerent types of taxes and tax rates, and the eﬀort in collecting taxes varies.
The monetary and price variables are there to identify monetary policy shocks. All the
components of national income are in real per capita terms. A more detailed description
can be found in appendix B.
An overview for our identifying sign restrictions on impulse responses is provided
in table Table 1. A ”+” means that the impulse response of the variable in question is
restricted to be positive for four quarters following the shock, including the quarter of
impact. Likewise, a ”-” indicates, that the response is restricted to be negative during
the ﬁrst post-shock year, and a ”0” indicates, that the response is exactly zero during
these four quarters. A blank entry indicates, that no restrictions have been imposed.
72.2 The identifying assumptions in detail.
A business cycle shock is a shock which jointly moves output, consumption, non-residential
investment and government revenue in the same direction. Such a co-movement could
have a number of causes, which we do not separate out further here. They could for
example be due to supply shocks of various kinds, or to demand shocks which drive up
consumption as well as investment simultaneously.
The restriction that government revenues increase with output in the business
cycle shock should be emphasized. This our crucial identifying assumption for ﬁscal
policy shocks: when output and government revenues move in the same direction, we
essentially assume that this must be due to some improvement in the business cycle
generating the increase in government revenue, not the other way around. We regard
this is a reasonable assumption, and consistent with a number of theoretical views.
Furthermore, our identifying assumptions are close to minimalistic: some assumptions
are needed to say anything at all. Obviously, the orthogonality assumption a priori
excludes the view that positive co-movements of government revenues and output are
caused by some form of ‘Laﬀer Curve” or ”ﬁscal consolidation” eﬀect of a surprise rise
in taxes.
A monetary policy shock moves interest rates up and reserves and prices down for
up to a year after the shock. These identifying restrictions are close to those used in
Uhlig (1997). We also require the monetary policy shock to be orthogonal to the business
cycle shock. To the extent that a monetary policy shock also moves output, consumption
and non-residential investment in the same direction, part of what is captured by the
business cycle shock may be due to monetary policy. However this is not a problem
for our method since our aim is to control for both shocks rather than to analyze the
consequences of monetary policy shocks ”per se.”
Fiscal policy shocks are identiﬁed only through restricting the impulse responses
of the ﬁscal variables and through the requirement that they are orthogonal to business
cycle shocks only or to both business cycle shocks as well as monetary policy shocks.
The ”deﬁcit spending shock” is identiﬁed as increasing government spending but leav-
ing government revenues unchanged and the ”revenue shock” is identiﬁed as increasing
government revenue but leaving government expenditures unchanged during the four-
quarter window following the shock. The ”balanced budget spending shock” is identiﬁed
by requiring both government revenues and expenditures to increase in such a way that
the sum of the weighted increase in revenues and expenditure is zero for each period
8in the four-quarter window following the shock.2 Since there does not seem to be a
consensus theoretical view on what ﬁscal policy shocks will do, and since the identifying
assumptions made here seem suﬃcient, we decided not to impose further restrictions.
2.3 Making it precise
To implement the identiﬁcation stated above, one needs to say a bit more. The identi-
ﬁcation of the ﬁscal shocks described above involves a combination of zero restrictions
(e.g. the impulse response of government revenues to a deﬁcit spending shock should zero
for the ﬁrst 4 quarters) and inequality restrictions. The zero restrictions are imposed
exactly and the inequality restrictions are imposed via the minimization of a criterion
function. Details on the methodology and terminology are in appendix A, where we also
deﬁne an impulse vector, introduce the new concept of an impulse matrix, and provide
a characterization. In this subsection, we concentrate on the key steps.
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t] = Σ
where Yt are m£1 vectors, L is the lag length of the VAR, Bi are m£m coeﬃcient matri-
ces and ut is the one step ahead prediction error. Let e A be the lower triangular Cholesky
factor of Σ. We do not use the Cholesky factorization for identiﬁcation. Appendix A
shows that it only serves as a useful computational tool, and any other factorization for
these calculations would deliver the same results.
Any shock or impulse vector, a, can be written as, a = e Aq, where q are the
identifying weights which are to be determined and where, q = [q1;:::;qm], jj q jj= 1.
Let ra(k) be the m dimensional impulse response at horizon k to the impulse vector a.





see equation (3) in appendix A.
The identifying restriction that the impulse responses of some variable to an im-
pulse vector a for the ﬁrst four quarters are zero, can be written as the linear restriction
0 = Rq
2The weights are the average shares in GDP over the sample of the government expenditure and
government revenue variables.
9where R is a 4 £ m matrix, see equations (4) and (5) in appendix A.
To additionally impose the inequality restrictions as well as orthogonality to the
business cycle shock, characterized by the weights q(1), say, we proceed as follows. Ap-
pendix A deﬁnes the penalty function f, deﬁned on the real line. We solve for the weights
q and thus a = e Aq by solving the minimization problem
q = argminRq=0;q0q(1)=0Ψ( e Aq) (2)


















The criterion function sums penalties over the four periods k = 0;:::3 following the
shock and over the indices of variables with positive (JS;+ ) and negative (JS;¡) sign
restrictions, respectively. The impulse responses are normalized by the standard error sj
of variable j.
Following Uhlig (1997), we use a Bayesian VAR, taking 100 draws from the poste-
rior, and identifying the shocks for each.
3 Results
The results can be seen in ﬁgures 2 through 10, where we have plotted the impulse
responses of our 10 variables to the shocks, identiﬁed according to the methodology
above. Impulse responses are in percent of the variable shown. The ﬁgures display the
16th, 50th and 84th quantiles of these impulse responses, calculated at each horizon
between 0 and 24 quarters after the shocks. Restrictions are indicated by vertical lines.
3.1 The Business Cycle Shock
Consider ﬁrst the business cycle shock in ﬁgure 2. In response to the business cycle shock,
output, consumption, non-residential investment and government revenue increase in the
ﬁrst four quarters by construction. Given that no restriction is placed on these responses
after four periods, it is notable that all of these responses are persistent. Government
revenues increase approximately twice as much in percentage terms as GDP. There is
no contradiction here, provided marginal tax rates are approximately twice average tax
10rates. The persistence in the non-residential investment variable indicates that a business
cycle shock may increase the steady state capital to labor ratio and so generate a higher
level of steady state income, consumption and government revenue. It must be stressed
that these responses are consistent with both demand and supply side explanations of
the business cycle and this paper is agnostic on the issue of the relative importance and
persistence of demand and supply shocks.
The responses of the monetary variables and the government spending variable
to the business cycle shock were not restricted at all by the identiﬁcation method and
their responses are quite interesting. The interest rate rises and the adjusted reserves
fall in response to a positive business cycle shock. This could be caused by a systematic
counter-cyclical response of monetary policy over the sample period, which ﬁts with the
description of monetary policy given by Romer and Romer (1994). The fall in adjusted
reserves (compared to the no-business-cycle-shock scenario) would indicate that this
counter-cyclical response is rather strong.
Government expenditures in contrast do not behave in a counter-cyclical fashion.
Rather they increase, slowly, with a positive business cycle shock. Thus if a business
cycle boom ﬁlls the government’s coﬀers with cash, it will spend more eventually. Note
again that, following Blanchard and Perotti (1999), we chose the government expendi-
ture variable to be government consumption and investment in order to isolate changes
in government expenditure from automatic changes over the business cycle. Thus the
government expenditure variable does not include transfer payments which almost surely
would automatically vary counter-cyclically.
3.2 The Monetary Policy Shock
The response to a monetary policy shock is shown in ﬁgure 3. Note that we have
constructed the monetary policy shock to be orthogonal to the business cycle shock shown
in ﬁgure 2. Thus this shock represents that part of the unanticipated quarterly change
in monetary policy that is not accounted for by systematic responses over the quarter to
unanticipated business cycle shocks. A consequence of our identiﬁcation strategy is that
if monetary policy shocks should be such that surprise rises in the interest rate cause
increases in output, consumption and investment, then these eﬀects would be captured
by the business cycle shock shown in the ﬁgure 2, not by the monetary shock shown
here. Thus, output, consumption and investment have to fall almost by construction
in ﬁgure 3, and they do, although interestingly by very little. The main purpose of
11characterizing the business cycle and monetary shocks is to ﬁlter out the eﬀects of these
shocks on the ﬁscal variables: the additional orthogonalization among these two shocks
has no eﬀect on that.
The results here are consistent with the conventional view that the surprise rise in
the interest rate leads to reductions in output, investment and consumption. The results
are also not inconsistent with the ﬁndings in Uhlig (1997): there, without orthogonality
to the business cycle shock, sign restriction methods do not deliver a clear direction for
real GDP in response to a surprise rise in interest rates. What is a little surprising is
the 1 percent rise in government revenue in response to a half percent rise in interest
rates. A plausible explanation is that over the sample period, monetary and ﬁscal policy
was coordinated so that a monetary tightening was accompanied by a ﬁscal tightening
via an increase in taxes as well. However this is not the only interpretation, it is also
conceivable that the increase in revenue comes from various forms of capital income
taxation via induced portfolio shifts.
3.3 The Revenue Shock
A revenue shock is identiﬁed as increasing government revenue but leaving government
expenditures unchanged during the four-quarter window following the shock. The re-
sponses of a revenue shock diﬀer markedly depending on whether it is restricted to be
orthogonal to the business cycle or not.
In ﬁgure 4, the revenue shock is identiﬁed without any orthogonality restrictions.
Here, real GDP, consumption, investment as well as interest rates increase in response
to a revenue increase. Thus if one was to draw a lesson from these responses, one would
conclude that raising taxes in order to lower deﬁcits is one way to stimulate the economy.
We ﬁnd it more plausible that this result is due to reverse causality i.e. government
revenue is rising because of a boom, rather than the other way around and that this
identiﬁcation of the ﬁscal policy shock is not appropriate. Thus what we see in ﬁgure 4
is more plausibly some version of a business cycle shock rather than a surprise change
in ﬁscal policy.
In ﬁgure 5 the revenue shock is restricted to be orthogonal to the business cycle
shock. Now, the responses look reasonable. GDP, consumption and residential invest-
ment fall in response to an increase in revenue although interestingly, nonresidential
investment rises somewhat before falling.
It is a bit hard to understand why interest rates should rise, though. After all,
12if the additional tax revenues are used for paying down the debt, one would expect
falling, rather than rising interest rates. A possible interpretation for these responses is
policy coordination and a joint belt tightening by both the ﬁscal as well as the monetary
authorities. If so, the issue arises as to whether it is the monetary authority or the ﬁscal
authority, which is responsible for ”kicking oﬀ” such a phase of higher prudence.
With this or with any other interpretation, one may suspect, that the rise in interest
rates is due to a confusion of ﬁscal policy shocks with monetary policy shocks. If so,
ﬁgure 6 provides the right answer: there, the revenue shock is restricted to be orthogonal
to both the business cycle shock and the monetary policy shock. A hike in interest rates
due to a monetary policy shock has an initially somewhat depressing eﬀect on output,
according to our results above: thus, taking these two responses out of the response to
a revenue increase when ordering the revenue shock third might be expected to lead to
a more expansionary result.
Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that there is practically no diﬀerence to ﬁgure 5 regarding
GDP, consumption and investment. There are some small diﬀerences in the response
of monetary variables, i.e. reserves, interest rates, and prices: their responses are now
smaller and often insigniﬁcant, when ordering the ﬁscal shock third. We conclude from
this, that controlling for the business cycle shock is important, but controlling for the
monetary policy shock is not, when analyzing the allocative consequences of ﬁscal policy.
Below, we shall investigate and conﬁrm this hypothesis also for the other ﬁscal shocks.
We note that our results diﬀer from a theoretical analysis based on Ricardian
neutrality or optimal tax smoothing, as these theories would predict that a marginal
change in the ﬁnancing of a given stream of government expenditures should have no
or only second-order eﬀects. A closer match to the data may be expected from theories
which analyze the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy changes from the perspective of intergenerational
redistribution and limits to the compensating eﬀects of bequests.
3.4 The Deﬁcit-Spending Shock
A deﬁcit spending shock is identiﬁed as increasing government spending but leaving
government revenues unchanged during the four-quarter window following the shock.
Figure 7 shows the responses when orthogonality to the business cycle shock is imposed
while orthogonality to both business cycle shocks and monetary policy shocks is imposed
for ﬁgure 8. Again, the diﬀerence between the responses in ﬁgures 7 and 8, is small.
The biggest diﬀerence again being the response of monetary variables, which are smaller
13and often insigniﬁcant.
Figure 8 shows that a deﬁcit spending shock stimulates output for the ﬁrst four
quarters although only weakly, see subsection 3.6. The deﬁcit spending shock does not
cause private consumption to change. It does reduce residential and non-residential
investment, although interestingly not via higher interest rates. These responses are
hard to reconcile with theories in which government expenditures is a substitute for
private consumption, but easier to reconcile with the position that the shocked part of
government expenditures are (possibly imperfect) substitutes for private investment. For
example an increase in investment in public sector housing may reduce private investment
in rentable housing. Total wealth stays unchanged, and it may thus be optimal to leave
consumption unchanged.
The response of prices to a deﬁcit spending shock is a little puzzling, in particular,
since it does not go away with controlling for the monetary policy shock. Both the GDP
deﬂator and the producer price index for crude materials show a decline in response to a
deﬁcit spending shock. This does not sit well either with standard textbook Keynesian
AS/AD models, where an increase in demand increases the price level, or with the recent
ﬁscal theory of the price level, in which an increase in public debt is associated with an
increase in the current or future price level, see for example Sims (1994). A possible
explanation for this is again the imperfect substitutability of public and private sector
investment. In the example of public and private sector housing investment, if the public
investment oﬀered lower priced housing than the private sector alternative, then the GDP
deﬂator would fall. This lower price may be due to the lower proﬁts from or lower quality
of publicly provided housing.
3.5 The Balanced Budget Spending Shock
The balanced budget spending shock is identiﬁed by requiring both government revenues
and expenditures to increase in such a way that the sum of the weighted increase in
revenues and expenditure is zero for each period in the four-quarter window following
the shock.3 The results are in ﬁgure 9, when assuming only orthogonality to the business
cycle shock, and in ﬁgure 10, when assuming orthogonality both to the business cycle
shock and the monetary policy shock. Again the diﬀerence between the responses in
ﬁgures 9 and 10, are small with the biggest diﬀerence being in the response of monetary
3The weights are the average shares in GDP over the sample of the government expenditure and
government revenue variables.
14variables.
The balanced-budget increase has a somewhat depressing eﬀect on the economy.
Both types of investment are reduced and the median output and consumption responses
are also negative although the conﬁdence band includes zero. In contrast to the deﬁcit-
spending shock there is no initial increase to GDP. One can think of a balanced-budget
shock roughly as a deﬁcit-spending shock plus a revenue shock, so in light of the results for
the other two ﬁscal shocks above, the results here should not surprise. The GDP deﬂator
decreases slowly, again consistent with the interpretation of imperfect substitutability of
public and private investment outlined above.
3.6 Multipliers
The impulse responses in ﬁgures 4 through 10 give an indication of the size of the
multipliers associated with each ﬁscal shock. However as the scale of these ﬁgures diﬀer
across shocks for some variables we place some descriptive statistics below in Table 2. We
also use information not in the impulse response ﬁgures to discuss the standard errors of
these ﬁgures. To do this we calculate the maximum and minimum multipliers of output
in the ﬁrst 24 quarters after each shock. The statistics for the median of these maximum
and minimum responses of output are placed in Table 3 along with the 16th, and 84th
percentiles which is the conﬁdence interval for this statistic.
Table 2 gives little support for the use of either government spending shocks to
stimulate the economy. The multiplier of the median impulse response of the deﬁcit
spending shock is quite low. On impact the multiplier is just 0.18, i.e. a $ 1 increase in
government spending increases GDP by only 18 cents. If one argues that the beneﬁts
of this policy work only after a lag then the maximum output response occurs at lag 3,
which implies a multiplier of just 0.5. As ﬁgure 10 shows, the balanced budget spending
shock is not expansionary at all and its most expansionary eﬀect is on impact with a
negative implied multiplier equal to - 0.07. The negative revenue shock in contrast is
quite expansionary with a sizeable multiplier of 0.16 initially rising to 1.95 after 9 lags.
That is to say a decrease in government revenues of $ 1 initially increases GDP by 16
cents but after 2 1/4 years GDP will be $1.95 higher, holding prices constant.
An important lesson one can draw here is that while a deﬁcit-ﬁnanced expenditure
stimulus is possible, the eventual costs are four times as high as the immediate beneﬁts.
For suppose that, ﬁrst, government spending is increased by two percent of GDP, ﬁnanced
by increasing the deﬁcit: this results, at maximum, in a one percent increase in GDP.
15Median Responses to Fiscal Shocks
Fiscal Shock Initial Response Maximum Response
Fiscal GDP Implied Fiscal GDP Implied
Shock Response Initial Shock Response Maximum
Multiplier Multiplier
Deﬁcit 0.69 0.026 0.18 0.69 0.072 0.50
Spending at lag 3
Balanced 0.46 -0.007 -0.074 0.46 -0.007 -0.074
Budget at lag 0
Negative 1.21 0.032 0.16 1.21 0.382 1.95
Revenue at lag 9
Shock
Table 2: These statistics are taken from the median impulse responses of the ﬁscal
shocks when they are identiﬁed third and restricted to be orthogonal to the monetary
and business cycle shocks. The multiplier statistic is calculated as follows: multiplier
= GDP response
Fiscal shock =(Average Fiscal variable share of GDP). This formula implies that
the initial multiplier of the deﬁcit spending shock is 0:026
0:69 =0:208, where 0.208 is the aver-
age fraction of GDP over the sample of the expenditure variable. We used ”government
spending” as the ﬁscal variable for the deﬁcit spending shock and the balanced budget
shock, and ”government revenue” as the ﬁscal variable for the revenue shock.
16But the increased deﬁcit needs to be repaid eventually with a hike in taxes. Even
ignoring compounded interest rates, this would require a tax hike yielding an increase
of government revenues by two percent of GDP. Assuming the tax hike to be a surprise,
when it occurs, allows us to use the results above. The tax hike results eventually in a
four percent drop in GDP, i.e. the overall net result is a fall in GDP of three percent. I.e.,
the costs are four times as high as the initial beneﬁt in terms of percent changes in GDP.
This reasoning is consistent with the balanced budget spending shock. We see below in
Table 3 that the minimum multiplier associated with the balanced budget spending has
a conﬁdence interval of -1.3 and -6.44.
Obviously, there is a considerable degree of uncertainty in these numbers, as we
have simply read the maximum multipliers oﬀ the median impulse responses. Standard
errors are therefore provided in table 3. Here, for each ﬁscal shock, and for each of our
100 draws from the posterior, we take the maximum and minimum multipliers of GDP
and also record the corresponding lag 4. We then order these maxima and minima and
report the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles in Table 3.
Table 3 in general supports the conclusions above. The maximum expansionary
eﬀect of a deﬁcit spending shock is much below that of the tax cutting negative revenue
shock, although the lower bound of the conﬁdence interval for the maximum response is
higher than 0.50. Interestingly, while the negative revenue shock’s maximum multiplier
is signiﬁcantly positive and its minimum multiplier is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
this is not the case for the two spending shocks. For these shocks both the maximum
and minimum responses are signiﬁcant and of diﬀering signs. This is probably due to
the increased variance in the impulse responses of these shocks at longer lag lengths. For
this reason we also look at the maximum and minimum multipliers of the two spending
shocks in the ﬁrst year after the shock. In this case we get the reasonable result that
the maximum multiplier of the deﬁcit spending shock is signiﬁcantly positive and the
minimum multiplier insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The balanced budget spending
shock is now also supportive of the conclusions above as its maximum multiplier is now
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero but its minimum multiplier is signiﬁcantly negative.
4The multiplier statistic is calculated in terms of the initial, lag 0, ﬁscal shock as follows: multiplier
= GDP response
Fiscal shock at Lag 0=(Average Fiscal variable share of GDP). We use ”government spending” as
the ﬁscal variable for the deﬁcit spending shock and the balanced budget shock, and ”government
revenue” as the ﬁscal variable for the revenue shock.
17Maximum and Minimum Multipliers to Fiscal Shocks
Fiscal Shock Maximum Multiplier Minimum Multiplier
(Median) (Median)
Maximum Conﬁdence Minimum Conﬁdence
Multiplier Interval Multiplier Interval
(Median) 16th,84th Quantiles (Median) 16th,84th Quantiles
Deﬁcit 1.2 2.53, 0.66 -0.92 -0.16, -2.70
Spending at lag 16 lag 10, lag 1 at lag 8 lag 2, lag 25
Balanced 0.87 2.57, 0.25 -3.46 -1.32, -6.44
Budget at lag 7 lag 6, lag 3 at lag 25 lag 13, lag 19
Negative 2.35 4.17, 1.26 0.26 1.11, -0.11
Revenue at lag 10 lag 20, lag 5 at lag 1 lag 23, lag 3
Shock
Deﬁcit 0.727 1.02, 0.463 - 0.0002 0.0002, -0.0008
Spending at lag 1 lag 3, lag 1 at lag 1 lag 3, lag 2
In First Year
Balanced 0.36 0.91, -0.07 -0.85 -0.40, -1.35
Budget at lag 1 lag 1, lag 1 at lag 3 lag 4, lag
In First Year
Table 3: These statistics relate to the distribution of the maximum and minimum mul-
tiplier eﬀects of each ﬁscal shock. For each draw the maximum and minimum ﬁscal
multiplier is calculated and the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles of these results are dis-
played. The multiplier statistic is calculated in terms of the initial, lag 0, ﬁscal shock as
follows: multiplier = GDP response
Fiscal shock at Lag 0=(Average Fiscal variable share of GDP).
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In this paper we have presented a new approach for distinguishing the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy shocks by adapting the method of Uhlig (1997). This approach imposes very
few restrictions on the nature of the ﬁscal policy shocks and in particular imposes no
restrictions on the responses of the key variables of interest - GDP, private consumption,
private residential and non-residential investment - to ﬁscal policy shocks. The paper
applied this approach using post war data on the US economy.
We have analyzed three types of shocks: a deﬁcit ﬁnanced spending increase, a
balanced budget spending increase (ﬁnanced with higher taxes) and a revenue shock, in
which revenues increase but government spending stays unchanged. We found that con-
trolling for the business cycle shock is important, but controlling for the monetary policy
shock is not, that government spending shocks signiﬁcantly crowd out both residential
and non-residential investment but do not reduce consumption, that a deﬁcit spending
shock stimulates the economy for the ﬁrst 4 quarters but has a very low median multi-
plier of 0:5, and that a revenue shock has a contractionary eﬀect on output, consumption
and investment.
Our results diﬀer from the benchmark of Ricardian equivalence or the benchmark
of tax smoothing, and are more in line with theories which allow for intergenerational
redistribution with limits to the compensating eﬀects of bequests. Our ﬁnding that
government spending crowds out both private residential and non-residential investment
without changing interest rates much is most consistent with a theoretical view, in which
shocks to government spending are (possibly imperfect) substitutes for private investment
rather than private consumption.
The best ﬁscal policy for stimulating the economy appears to be (surprise) deﬁcit-
ﬁnanced tax cuts. We wish to point out that this should not be read as endorsing them.
This paper only points out, that deﬁcit-ﬁnanced surprise tax cuts work as a (possibly
short-lived) stimulus to the economy, not, that they are sensible. The resulting higher
debt burdens may have long-term consequences which are far worse than the short-term
increase in GDP, and surprising the economy may not be good policy in any case. These
normative judgements require theoretical models, for which the empirical positive results
in this paper can provide a useful starting point.
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A VARs and impulse matrices




BiYt¡i + ut ;t = 1;::::T; E[utu
0
t] = Σ
where Yt are m £ 1 vectors, L is the lag length of the VAR, Bi are m £ m coeﬃcient
matrices and ut is the one step ahead prediction error.
The problem of identiﬁcation is to translate the one step ahead prediction errors,
ut, into economically meaningful, or ‘fundamental’, shocks, vt. We adopt the common
assumptions in the VAR literature that there are m fundamental shocks, which are mu-
tually orthogonal and normalized to be of variance 1. Thus E[vtv0
t] = Im. Identiﬁcation
of these shocks amounts to identifying a matrix A, such that ut = Avt and AA0 = Σ. The
jth column of A represents the immediate impact, or impulse vector, of a one standard
error innovation to the jth fundamental innovation, which is the jth element of v. The
following deﬁnition is useful, and new.
Deﬁnition 1 An impulse matrix of rank n is a n £ m sub-matrix of some m £ m
matrix A, such that AA0 = Σ.
An impulse vector a is an impulse matrix of rank 1, i.e. is a vector a 2 Rm such
that there exists some matrix A; where a is a column of A; such that AA0 = Σ.
One can show that the identiﬁcation does not depend on the particular matrix A
chosen beyond a given impulse matrix, i.e. a given impulse matrix uniquely identiﬁes
the fundamental shocks corresponding to it:
Theorem 1 Suppose that Σ is regular. Let a given impulse matrix [a(1);:::;a(n)] of size
n be a submatrix of two m£m matrices A, ˜ A with AA0 = ˜ A ˜ A0 = Σ. Let vt = A¡1ut; ˜ vt =




t resp. ˜ v
(1)
t ;:::; ˜ v
(n)
t be the entries in vt resp. ˜ vt corresponding
to a(1);:::;a(n), i.e., if e.g. a(1) is the third column of A, then v
(1)
t is the third entry of
vt. Then, v
(i)
t = ˜ v
(i)
t for all i = 1;:::;n.
Proof: W.l.o.g., let [a(1);:::;a(n)] be the ﬁrst n column of A and ˜ A. If this is e.g.
not the case for A and if e.g. a(1) is the third column of A, one can ﬁnd a permutation
20matrix P so that the given impulse matrix will be the ﬁrst n columns of ˆ A = AP with
a(1) the ﬁrst column of ˆ A. Since PP 0 = I, ˆ A ˆ A0 = Σ. Furthermore, the ﬁrst column of P
is the vector e3, which is zero except for a 1 in its third entry: hence the ﬁrst entry of
ˆ A¡1ut = P 0vt must be the third entry of vt and thus be v
(1)
t corresponding to a(1).





t ]0 = EnA¡1ut. We need to show that EnA¡1ut = En ˜ A¡1ut for all ut.











= En ˜ A
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0
= En ˜ A
¡1Σ
²
In the VAR literature identiﬁcation usually proceeds by
identifying all m fundamental shocks and so characterizing the entire A matrix.
This requires imposing m(m ¡ 1)=2 restrictions on the A matrix. This is done either by
assuming a recursive ordering of variables in the VAR, so that a Cholesky decomposition
of A can be used, see Sims (1986), or by imposing the m(m ¡ 1)=2 restrictions via
assumed short run structural relationships as in Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard and
Watson(1986), via assumed long run structural relationships, as in Blanchard and Quah
(1989) or via both assumed short run and long run structural relationships as in Gali
(1992).
This paper instead extends the method of Uhlig (1997) and identiﬁes at most three
fundamental shocks and so needs to characterize an impulse matrix [a(1);a(2);a(3)] of rank
3 rather than all of A. This is accomplished by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse







t corresponding to a(1);a(2) and a(3) is zero, i.e. that these fundamental
shocks are orthogonal.
To that end, note that any impulse matrix [a(1);:::;a(n)] can be written as the
product [a(1);:::;a(n)] = e AQ of the lower triangular Cholesky factor e A of Σ with an
n £ m matrix Q = [q(1);:::;q(n)] of orthonormal rows q(i), i.e. QQ0 = In: this follows
21from noting that e A¡1A must be an orthonormal matrix for any decomposition AA0 = Σ
of Σ. Likewise, Let a = a(s), s 2 f1;:::;ng be one of the columns of the impulse matrix
and q = q(s) = e A¡1a(s) be the corresponding column of Q: note that q(s) does not depend
on the other a(p), p 6= s. As in Uhlig (1997), it follows easily that the impulse responses
for the impulse vector a can be written as a linear combination of the impulse responses
to the Cholesky decomposition of Σ as follows. Deﬁne rji(k) as the impulse response
of the jth variable at horizon k to the ith column of e A; and the m dimensional column
vector ri(k) as [r1i(k);:::;rmi(k)]. Then the m dimensional impulse response ra(k) at





(where qi is the i-th entry of q = q(s)), delivering equation (1).
The identifying restriction that the impulse responses of the j-th variable to an
impulse vector a for the ﬁrst four periods are zero, can be written as a restriction on the
vector q that
0 = Rq (4)











Deﬁne the function f on the real line per f(x) = 100x if x ¸ 0 and f(x) = x
if x · 0. Let sj be the the standard error of variable j. Let JS;+ be the index set of
variables, for which identiﬁcation of a given shock restricts the impulse response to be
positive and let JS;¡ be the index set of variables, for which identiﬁcation restricts the
impulse response to be negative. To impose the additional identifying inequality sign
restrictions beyond the zero restrictions of equation (4), we solve
a = argmina= e Aq;Rq=0Ψ(a) (6)


















22Computationally, we implement this minimization, using a simplex algorithm: it is avail-
able on many statistical packages as e.g. MATLAB and RATS; for this paper we use
the version of the algorithm written in GAUSS by Bo Honore and Ekaterini Kyriazidou,
available from http://www.princeton.edu/ honore/.
To identify an impulse matrix [a(1);a(2)], where the ﬁrst shock is a business cycle
shock and the second shock is a ﬁscal policy shock, ﬁrst identify the business cycle shock
a(1) = e Aq(1) in the manner described above and then identify the second shock a(2) by
replacing the minimization problem 6 with
a = argmina= e Aq;Rq=0;q0q(1)=0Ψ(a) (7)
i.e. by additionally imposing orthogonality to the ﬁrst shock. The two restrictions
Rq = 0;q0q(1) = 0 can jointly be written as
0 = e Rq (8)
where e R0 = [q(1);R0]. Likewise, if orthogonality to two shocks - the business cycle shock
and the monetary policy shock - is required, identify the business cycle shock a(1) = e Aq(1)
and identify the monetary policy shock a(2) = e Aq(2) and solve
a = argmina= e Aq;Rq=0;q0q(1);q0q(2)=0Ψ(a) (9)
Given the above we can now state our identiﬁcation restrictions more formally. We
only provide two: the others follow the same pattern.
Deﬁnition 2 A business cycle shock impulse vector is an impulse vector a, that
minimizes a criterion function Ψ(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses of GDP,
private consumption, nonresidential investment and government revenue at horizons k =
0;1;2; and 3.
Deﬁnition 3 A revenue shock impulse vector is an impulse vector a minimizing
a criterion function Ψ(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses to the vector a
of government revenue at horizons k = 0;1;2; and 3 subject to the restriction that the
impulse responses to the vector a of government spending are zero at horizons k = 0;1;2;
and 3.
For the latter deﬁnition, we further distinguish the three cases, given by the three
minimization problems (6), (7) and (9), depending on which of the additional orthogonal-
ity assumptions to the business cycle shock and the monetary policy shock are imposed.
23The computations are performed, using a Bayesian approach as in Uhlig (1997),
see also Sims and Zha (1998). We take 100 draws from the posterior. For each draw from
the posterior of the VAR coeﬃcients and the variance-covariance matrix Σ, the shocks
are identiﬁed using the criteria described above. Given this sample of 100 draws for the
impulse responses, conﬁdence bands can be plotted.
B The Data
All the data we use is freely available from the World Wide Web. The data on compo-
nents of US national income is taken from the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) which are made publically available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis on
their website http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/uguide.htm. The monetary data, - the interest
rate, producer commodity price index and adjusted reserves - , is taken from the Federal
Reserve Board of St Louis’ website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.
B.1 Deﬁnitions of Variables in the VAR
All the components of national income are in real per capita terms and are transformed
from their nominal values by dividing them by the gdp deﬂator (NIPA table 7.1 Row
4) and the population measure (NIPA table 2.1 Row 35). The table and row numbers
refers to the organization of the data by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
GDP: This is NIPA table 1.1 Row 1.
Private Consumption: This is NIPA table 1.1 Row 1.
Total Government Expenditure: This is ‘Federal Defense Consumption Expendi-
tures’, NIPA table 3.7 Row 4, plus ‘Federal Non Defense Consumption Expendi-
tures’, NIPA table 3.7 Row 15, plus ‘State and Local Consumption Expenditures’,
NIPA table 3.7 Row 28. plus ‘Federal Defense Gross Investment’, NIPA table 3.7
Row 11, plus ‘Federal Non Defense Gross Investment ’, NIPA table 3.7 Row 24,
plus ‘State and Local Gross Investment’, NIPA table 3.7 Row 35.
24Total Government Revenue5: This is ‘Total Government Receipts’, NIPA table 3.1
Row 1, minus ‘Net Transfers Payments’, NIPA table 3.1 Row 8, and ‘Net Interest
Paid’, NIPA table 3.1 Row 11.
Private Residential Investment: This is ‘Private Residential Investment, NIPA
table 1.1 Row 11.
Private Non-Residential Investment: This is ‘Nominal Gross Private Domestic
Investment’, NIPA table 1.1 Row 6,.minus private residential investment, NIPA
table 1.1 Row 11.
Interest Rate: This is the Federal Funds rate which is the series fedfunds at the
Federal Reserve Board of St Louis’ website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/. We take
the arithmetic average of the monthly ﬁgures for the Federal Funds Rate.
Adjusted Reserves: This is the Adjusted Monetary Base given by the series adjressl
series at the Federal Reserve Board of St Louis’ website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.
We take the arithmetic average of the monthly ﬁgures to get a quarterly ﬁgure.
PPIC: This the Producer Price Index of Crude Materials given by the series ppicrm
at the Federal Reserve Board of St Louis’ website http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.
We take the arithmetic average of the monthly ﬁgures to get a quarterly ﬁgure.
The GDP Deﬂator: This is NIPA table 7.1 Row 4.
The VAR system consists of these 10 variables at quarterly frequency from 1955(Q1)
to 2000(Q4), has 6 lags, no constant or time trend, and uses the logarithm for all variables
except the interest rate where we have used the level.
The ﬁscal variable are chosen so that they will have diﬀerent responses to business
cycle movements and ﬁscal policy shocks. The government expenditure variable is chosen
so as to exclude expenditures which will vary over the business cycle such as transfer
payments, see for example Blanchard (1997) p 600 on this. The government receipts
variable should clearly respond positively to a business cycle shock, an increase in output
should increase tax receipts and reduce transfer payments.
5 This deﬁnition follows Blanchard and Perotti (1999) in regarding transfer payments as negative
taxes. We use this deﬁnition in order not to obscure the implications of the new identiﬁcation technique
used in this paper, by using diﬀerent data.
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Figure 1: Arrangement of the impulse response panels in the ﬁgures.
30Figure 2: The business cycle shock, ordered ﬁrst.
31Figure 3: The monetary policy shock ordered 2nd.
32Figure 4: The revenue shock ordered ﬁrst.
33Figure 5: The revenue shock ordered 2nd.
34Figure 6: The revenue shock ordered 3rd.
35Figure 7: The deﬁcit spending shock ordered 2nd.
36Figure 8: The deﬁcit spending shock ordered 3rd.
37Figure 9: The balanced budget shock ordered 2nd.
38Figure 10: The balanced budget shock ordered 3rd.
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